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Since 2007, Ireland has suffered a circa 80% reduction in construction output. This has resulted in bankruptcy,
unemployment and bad debt. Contractors have attached greater emphasis to production efficiency and cost
reduction as a means of survival. An action research (AR) strategy was used to improve processes adopted by
a small/medium enterprise (SME) contractor for the control of defects in its supply chain. It is conservatively
estimated that rework, typically, accounts for circa 5% of total project costs. Rework is wasteful and presents
an obvious target for improvement. The research reported here concerns the (first) diagnosing stage of the
AR cycle only, involving: observation of fieldwork, analysis of contract documents, and semi-structured inter-
views with supply chain members. The results indicate potential for supply chain participants to identify root
causes of defects and propose solutions, having regard to best practice to avoid reoccurrence. A lack of collab-
orative forums to contribute to production improvement was identified. Additionally the processes used to col-
lect, manage and disseminate data were unstructured and uncoordinated, indicating scope for developing more
efficient methods. The findings indicate a good understanding of the potential benefits for supply chain collab-
oration but suggest that the tools and knowledge to collaborate are currently lacking in the SME sector.
Keywords: Action research, defects, rework, snagging, supply chain collaboration.
Introduction
The construction industry tends to renew its focus on
improving production processes, with the aim of
removing waste, during times of austerity. Koskela
et al. (2012) trace the historical interest in production
waste to the start of the twentieth century, noting that
it has never been a prevalent concept in construction
management or indeed management literature
generally.
In times of high demand, building contractors are
able to neglect build quality to some extent, in the rush
to completion. Thereafter they either avoid remedial
works or mask the consequences of rework behind
higher profit margins (Sommerville et al., 2004). The
Barker review on UK housing supply, published in
2004, noted that contractors did not have to deliver a
particularly good finished product to secure market
share (Barker, 2004).
The research reported here was carried out in the
Republic of Ireland (Ireland), but should be of value
in other jurisdictions. For a number of reasons, includ-
ing geographical, historical and linguistic the construc-
tion production processes used in Ireland are similar to
those of the UK (Thomas and Hore, 2003). This
research reports results from the diagnosing (stage
one) and preliminary consideration of action planning
(stage two) of an action research (AR) improvement
project involving a small/medium enterprise (SME)
building contractor. It is intended that the remainder
of the AR cycle be reported in future papers.
Ireland suffered a severe economic downturn in
2007. Construction has borne a disproportionate part
of the burden in terms of bankruptcy, debt and
unemployment. Construction output (baseline figure
100 in 2005) rose to a peak of 106.2 (Q2 2007) and
has collapsed to 23.6 (Q1 2013), a decline approaching
80% (Taggart et al., 2012; Central Statistics Office
Ireland, 2013). Prior to 2007, the industry was at the
forefront of a property-led boom, although its predom-
inance, at 24% of gross national product, was seen as
unsustainable by many commentators (DKN
*Author for correspondence. E-mail: martin.taggart@gmit.ie
© 2014 The Author(s). Published by Routledge.
This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/,
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. The moral rights of the named
author(s) have been asserted.
Construction Management and Economics, 2014
Vol. 32, Nos. 7–8, 829–842, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01446193.2014.904965
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [C
om
pu
tin
g &
 L
ibr
ary
 Se
rv
ice
s, 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of
 H
ud
de
rsf
iel
d]
 at
 05
:18
 16
 Ju
ly 
20
15
 
Economic Consultants, 2009; Kelly, 2009). The
industry is currently undertaking a painful adjustment,
shedding over half of its workforce and also adapting to
a new reality, with tender prices having reduced by
circa 28% from peak (Society of Chartered Surveyors
Ireland, 2012). Some optimism has returned in 2013,
with the Ulster Bank Construction Purchasing
Managers’ Index reporting raised orders and the
highest optimism since 2007. Employment and current
activity are still, however, falling marginally (Ulster
Bank, 2013).
In response to this environment, contractors
focused on lowering tender costs to increase workload.
Weaker companies resorted to below cost bidding as a
survival strategy (Society of Chartered Surveyors
Ireland, 2012). Davis Langdon (2011) reported that
this practice is now moderating and some stability has
returned to pricing levels.
Defects are discovered at many stages of
production: during construction, during terminal
inspections, after the project has been handed over,
or in the subsequent maintenance period (Love and
Edwards, 2004). The particular focus of this research
concerns defects discovered at or near the end of
construction projects. Rotimi et al. (2011) define these
defects as ‘snags’ and the process of identification and
rectification as ‘snagging’. These terms are readily used
and understood within the industry, but do not appear
with any prominence in the literature (Sommerville
et al., 2004).
The research is justified by reference to the costs
involved. The available literature suggests a figure of
5% of total project cost could conservatively be attrib-
uted to rework and defects. Hwang et al. (2009) suggest
such a percentage for the United States of America and
Love (2002a) applied similar percentages in Australia,
both generating frightening results in terms of the
amount of money being wasted. Applied to Ireland,
such a percentage would mean circa €1.89 billion
(2007) was wasted at the peak of the recent boom. In
more challenging times (2012) a figure of circa €375
million applies. Economic consultants DKN (2011)
suggest that the industry will recover to sustainable lev-
els over the medium term, suggesting that waste
associated with rework and defects may likewise
‘recover’ to circa €850 million per annum in the
medium term.
Research aims and participants in the
research
The purpose of the research and empirical work
described herein was twofold. First to assist a small/
medium enterprise (SME) to improve its productive
processes towards the elimination/reduction of rework
and defects. Secondly the work seeks to contribute to
theory in the area of defects elimination and manage-
ment through dissemination of the research findings
(Baskerville, 1999; Robson, 2002). This involved work
in the following areas: (1) understanding and improv-
ing defects identification and management systems;
(2) providing an understanding of the costs involved;
(3) providing root cause analysis into defects with the
aim of avoiding future repetition; and (4) training and
learning.
The construction company involved in the study is a
regional SME established in business over 15 years.
The company was driven by its managing director
and flourished during the boom, but now, like others,
finds itself in reduced circumstances in terms of
turnover and workload. The company is engaged in
industrial, commercial, public works and biomedical
projects. Using European Commission Recommenda-
tion 2003/361/EC on the classification of companies
the company is classified as ‘small’ if it has fewer than
50 employees, less than or equal to €10 million
turnover and less than or equal to €10 million balance
sheet.
Research strategy: action research
Action research is a pragmatic research strategy since at
its core is the epistemological paradigm that the ‘truth’
to be found is based upon the utility of the research
(Azhar et al., 2010). It is a powerful tool for researchers
who are interested in finding out about the interplay of
humans, technology, information and social-cultural
contexts (McKay and Marshall, 2001). AR seeks to
address some of the deficiencies found in traditional
research approaches in regard to relevancy. Traditional
research has tended towards descriptive and explana-
tory approaches, somewhat at the expense of more pre-
scriptive knowledge, having direct relevance to industry
(AlSehaimi et al., 2013). AR also involves the adapta-
tion of new approaches or practices to empirical cir-
cumstances (Altrichter et al., 2002; Bresnen and
Marshall, 2001). This is, essentially, the goal of this
research.
AR seeks to contribute to the practical concerns of
people in problematic situations while contributing to
scientific knowledge in a collaborative effort (Rapoport,
1970; Hult and Lennung, 1980; Baskerville and Myers,
2004). This stance is supported by Susman and Evered
(1978) who additionally suggest that AR should
develop the self-help competencies of problem-solvers
within organizations. AR typically involves a ‘cycle’ or
‘spiral’ of five project stages (Susman and Evered,
1978) (see Figure 1). These stages entail: (1)
830 Taggart et al.
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diagnosing, involving identification and defining the
scope of the problem; (2) action planning, which
requires consideration of alternative actions for
addressing the problem; (3) action taking, which
involves implementing an improvement plan; (4) eval-
uating, which requires study of the consequences of
the actions; and (5) specifying learning, which is used
to identify findings and suggest improvements for fur-
ther iterations of the cycle.
AR combines data generation from a social system
with an intention to provide positive change. Lewin
(1946) noted that the most important factor in social
science should be to practically contribute to the
change and betterment of both society and its institu-
tions. The AR strategy is founded on five tenets: (1)
having clear goals and a commitment to values; (2)
contextually focused; (3) the explanation of research
materials concerning the changes; (4) active researcher
participation in the process; and (5) the dissemination
of the research (Elden and Chisholm, 1993). AR pro-
motes organizational change, towards the betterment
of participants, as well as the normal research outputs
of description, understanding and explanation
(Robson, 2002).
Research methods
Given the nature of AR, a substantial amount of diverse
qualitative data was produced. A flexible design
approach was selected to manage the data. It is difficult
to disaggregate the multiple and interactive causes of
defects in any meaningful way or relate them usefully
to objective features of the context. Thus the research
strategy adopted here allows the problems to be
considered holistically (Shammas-Toma et al., 1996;
Seymour et al., 1997). A literature review was con-
ducted to build up knowledge of the problem, first in
the area of construction supply chains focusing on col-
laborative working practices and secondly in the area of
construction rework and defects. The supply chain lit-
erature is extensive and the defects literature more
modest. Sommerville et al. (2004) reported that snag-
ging data and the snagging process itself have rarely
been written about in the UK. A field study took place
on one of the SME’s projects to assess in detail how
they managed rework and defects and to gather data
about the root causes of the problems they
encountered.
The field researcher (author 1) spent time (typically
one half day per week) over a four-month period on the
project, and ‘participated’ in the process of snagging
data as a participative observer (Vinten, 1994; Gill
and Johnson, 2002). This participation included
unstructured observation and photographing of activi-
ties (Mulhall, 2003). Semi-structured interviews were
conducted with a broad cross-section of project partic-
ipants to gain understanding of their opinions and to
understand the context, with a view to enabling change
(Robson, 2002). Interviewees included architect, ser-
vices designers, contracts director, site manager, sub-
contractors and material suppliers. Additionally,
informal conversations with site operatives took place
and were summarized and recorded, in field notes. A
final means of data gathering was to collate and analyse
the documented parts of the snagging process used on
the project. This included copies of drawings and spec-
ifications, programme, requests for information and
terminal snag lists. The research was open and trans-
parent. Posters were placed on site explaining who
DIAGNOSING
EVALUATING
SPECIFYING
LEARNING
ACTION PLANNING
ACTION TAKING
Considering alternative
course of action for
solving a problem
Identifying or
defining a problem
Identifying general
findings
Development of
a client-system
infrastructure
Selecting a
course of action
Studying the
consequences of
an action
Figure 1 The action research cycle (Susman and Evered, 1978)
Rework and defects 831
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the field researcher was and his intentions. Stakehold-
ers were free to engage with the research or not as they
saw fit (Denscombe, 2010).
Definitions
The term ‘rework’ describes work that has to be done
for a second time. This results from a variety of errors
in execution, but also from client-led changes (Love
and Edwards, 2004). If the defect is caused by the for-
mer it is unlikely the contractor will be paid for rectifi-
cation, but if the cause is the latter the contractor may
be entitled to contractual recompense. Love and
Edwards (2004, p. 207) define rework as ‘unnecessary
effort of re-doing a process or activity that was incor-
rectly implemented the first time’. This definition is
not entirely satisfactory as it can be seen that, in the
context of some client-led changes for instance, the ori-
ginal work may have been implemented correctly, but is
now redundant. Thus at a holistic project level it may
well have been unnecessary, without necessarily having
been implemented incorrectly.
Likewise, Hwang et al. (2009, p. 188) suggest:
‘Rework is the process by which an item is made to con-
form to the original requirements by completion or cor-
rection.’ Again, in some circumstances the item may
well conform to the original requirements but must still
be changed for some reason. Rework is clearly repeat
work, but its definition must and can only be consid-
ered in the particular contractual contexts that apply.
From the contractor’s perspective it is often a question
of whether it will be paid for the rework.
Shammas-Toma et al. (1996) clearly noted that
interview discussion on causation of defects in their
studies was coloured by an awareness of contractual lia-
bility.
The focus here concerns defects identified and re-
mediated at or around the end of projects commonly
known in the industry as ‘snagging’, though this is a
term not often found in the literature (Sommerville,
2007). Other terms used with a similar meaning to snag
include faults, repairs, quality failures, deviation,
non-conformance and rework. Often these are used
interchangeably with the same or similar meaning
(Sommerville, 2007; Rotimi et al., 2011). Precise,
agreed definitions in the area of defects and snagging
are absent (Georgiou et al., 1999; Iiozor et al., 2004).
Defects causation
A number of contributions reflect on root causes of
defects with a general consensus that cause usually lies
deeper than a superficial blaming of construction oper-
atives and managers (Atkinson, 1999), albeit that in
some cases they are contributors. Broad agreement is
found on a common core of practical causes; others
explore more theoretical contributions. Sommerville
(2007) evaluated work by the Building Research Estab-
lishment (BRE), to identify defect causes. This
assigned cause to three broad headings: design issues
(50%); construction phase issues (40%); and product
failures (10%). Josephson et al. (2002) looking at simi-
lar areas suggested: design related causes (26%); site
production/process (20%); workmanship (20%); mate-
rials failure (17%); client issues (6%); and machinery
failure (3%). The causation headings are similar, but
the allocation of cause is not. This is possibly related
to different definitions, conceptual frameworks and
models. The influence of design errors (as illustrated
above) on defects that occur later in the supply chain
is well considered in the literature. Design errors are
diverse in nature and in the severity of their impact
(Lopez et al., 2010). Influencing factors on the propen-
sity of design errors include unrealistic design pro-
grammes, organizational culture, lack of quality
assurance practices, inadequate scoping of client needs
and lack of a common language with which to articulate
client wants (Lopez et al., 2010).
Love et al. (2009) produced a list of 29 possible
rework causes. These are loosely categorized as (1)
scope changes; (2) erroneous design/documentation;
(3) lack of quality management systems; and (4) poor
workmanship. Mining into these headings, a number
of factors are prominent, including (1) misinterpreta-
tion of drawings and specifications; (2) use of super-
seded drawings and specifications in the supply chain;
(3) poor or imprecise communications; (4) lack of sup-
ply chain coordination; (5) poor training and skill levels;
and inadequate supervision (Chong and Low, 2005).
Love et al. (1999) discussing the work of Shewhart
(1931) in a construction context, suggest two root
cause factors of defects: first, those that originate
because of problems in the production process, termed
common causes, for example poor information flow
between supply chain participants. Secondly, special
causes that arise outside the production process,
beyond the contractor’s immediate control, e.g. unilat-
eral client changes. They suggest that 85% of all con-
struction rework emanates from the former and only
15% from the latter (Love et al., 1997).
Atkinson (1999) found commonality with others in
areas which he terms ‘primary’ and ‘managerial’. These
cover causation themes discussed previously. He
extends the debate to consider the impact of ‘global’
factors such as organizational culture, economic pres-
sures and societal pressures as contributory root causes.
Returning to this theme in 2002, he found a predomi-
nance of managerial root causes, albeit with a signifi-
cant contribution from global factors (Atkinson,
832 Taggart et al.
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2002). Shammas-Toma et al. (1996) in a similar vein
differentiate between defects which appear during con-
struction, but are caused by the supply chain, prior to
construction (such as design). These are termed ‘man-
agement controllable’. A second category concerns
defects occurring at the point of production, termed
‘operative controllable’. The authors note that most
quality systems they observed in the field are only capa-
ble of detecting the latter.
Josephson and Hammarlund (1999) took a broader
look at causation in a longitudinal study of seven major
projects. They note that motivation to produce good
work is insufficient and that operatives must also have
the necessary knowledge and information to execute
the task correctly. In many cases this was lacking. They
noted several factors that contributed to higher defect
levels, including: (1) delays in decision-making by cli-
ents; (2) late involvement of end user; (3) contractual
pressures in terms of cost and time. Conversely they
also note some disarmingly simple factors that tend to
limit defect levels: (1) stability in the client and design
team composition; (2) previous experience of working
with project participants; (3) supportive project man-
agement; leading to (4) higher motivation.
Love et al. (2009) suggested that underperformance
(such as having high defects) is often explained away as
an unusual aberration by participants. This is because
they do not wish to draw attention to such an unpalat-
able situation, lest they be harshly judged by customers
and others. The cost of such non-conformance can
drastically increase overall costs and impact on profit
margins. Rooke et al. (2004) note practices whereby
contractors manipulate poor design and specification
for commercial advantage. The authors reported on
the strategy of bidding low to win projects which they
perceive as having a high probability of delays and
claims. This extended to anticipation of poor design
that would prove impossible to execute and manipulat-
ing the programme to maximize the chances of delay.
The opportunity for such practices is dependent upon
procurement and contractual arrangements. The
authors noted that such practices increase in times of
austerity.
Construction companies tend to rely on the practice
of identification of defects during interim and terminal
inspections. This is often driven by formal quality sys-
tems. This approach however deals with the symptoms,
while root causes remain hidden (Shammas-Toma
et al., 1996). Eradication of root causes provides a
long-term solution to the problem of defects. Seymour
et al. (1997) agree with this proposition. They note that
companies engage in ‘fire-fighting’ what they perceive
to be sporadic defects, when in fact they face chronic
defects. Little attention is given to understanding and
eliminating the latter. The cost of prevention measures
is usuallyminimal when compared to the costs of rework,
scrap materials and lost time (Abdul-Rahman, 1996).
Cost of rework and defects
While there is some consensus in the literature con-
cerning causation, the literature on the costs of rework
and defects is very fragmented. A wide range of sug-
gested cost estimates are allied to a number of disparate
models for calculating costs. These models all have dif-
fering variables as to what should be counted. No obvi-
ous standard approach is found in construction (Fayek
et al., 2004). Almost all of the cost estimates found are
expressed as a percentage of the total project cost
(TPC). The defects found in snagging are generally
attributable to specific contractor organizations and
individuals. They can thus be measured and costs
aggregated to act as a baseline for improvement targets
(Sommerville et al., 2004). The actual cost of rework
and defects is seldom measured by contractors so they
have no reliable basis for accurate analysis (Love,
2002a).
Josephson et al. (2002), discussing the work of
Feigenbaum in a construction context, suggest that
costs should be considered on three levels to obtain a
holistic view:
 Failure costs: defects that are found either before
or after handover.
 Appraisal costs: the costs of checks and inspec-
tions.
 Prevention costs: the costs of systems and pre-
ventative measures.
The authors do not underestimate the difficulties of
implementing measures to capture the costs associated
with these elements. Return visits to complete rework
and defects are a common factor. They are a very inef-
ficient practice and often lead to multiple cost implica-
tions, particularly if the return visits take place during
the maintenance period. This often involves extra
expenditure on elements such as travelling time, non-
productive time, additional access, equipment and
plant. This phenomenon can be considered in terms
of direct costs (specifically associated with the defect)
and indirect costs (associated with the return visit)
(Love and Edwards, 2004). The latter authors describe
one case where the indirect costs were 22.5 times the
direct costs. On similar lines, Nielsen et al. (2009) dif-
ferentiate between ‘physical’ defects where documenta-
tion, material or structure lacks abilities according to
contract or good practice. These are contrasted with
‘process’ defects, where the process takes place in a
fashion that represents a significant time or resource
loss compared to the optimum.
Rework and defects 833
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A small number of field studies are available provid-
ing empirical evidence of costs, usually presented as a
percentage of TPC. Most urge caution in terms of gen-
eralization and suggest consideration of the particular
context is essential. Love et al. (2004) note that a range
of rework costs ranging from 3% to 23% are reported in
the literature, but caution that much of the data is esti-
mated due to lack of factual cost reporting. Love et al.
(1999) had suggested that holistic costs of rework could
range as high as 12.4% of TPC. Love and Li (2000) car-
ried out two detailed case studies and reported that
rework costs in those were 3.15% and 2.4%, also sug-
gesting that use of a formal quality management system
can substantially reduce costs of rework and defects.
Love and Sohal (2003) reported that the Singapore
Development Board suggested that between 5% and
10% of TPC was being wasted on defects and rework
costs. Nielsen et al. (2009), discussing Denmark, anec-
dotally report that defects are considered to represent an
economic loss of around 10% of construction turnover.
In their longitudinal study, Josephson and
Hammarlund (1999) suggested that rework costs
ranged from 2% to 6% during construction and
additionally from 3% to 5% during the maintenance
period. Josephson et al. (2002) looked at construction
related rework (excluding that related to design), find-
ing costs came to 4.4% of TPC; the additional time
required to rectify the defects was however 7.1% of
time. The authors suggest that on typical projects con-
tractors spend at least three weeks per year doing
rework. American studies indicate a figure of 5% in
rework and defects mitigation (Hwang et al., 2009).
Aoieong et al. (2002) reported that nearly 60% of
American contractors had not tried to measure rework
costs; those that had, returned a figure of around 5% of
TPC. In studies in Hong Kong, they also noted that
main contractors have no great interest in unearthing
the true cost of rework, as the majority of it is carried
out by subcontractors. To some extent the main con-
tractors are concerned with the end product only, not
the process that delivers it. As they were not directly
suffering any financial loss, they were unconcerned.
Love (2002b) suggests that many costs are hidden
in the process and could well range up to 25% in some
cases. Noting the lack of any uniformity of suggested
cost models, he suggests that field reports should not
be taken as definitive, but viewed only as an illustrative
source of reference.
Collaboration in the supply chain
The production model in Ireland is generally one of
‘shell’ main contractors, arranging the work of numer-
ous and fragmented subcontractors, selected on the
basis of lowest cost (Green and May, 2003). This
structure tends to inhibit the levels of collaboration
needed to address problems such as defects (Seymour
et al., 1997). The Irish industry is at once very adversar-
ial, while also having a sophisticated understanding of
the possibilities and benefits from collaborative working
practices. A substantial majority in the industry feel
that collaboration, or at least, better cooperation is an
essential element of their future success (Taggart
et al., 2012).
Karim et al. (2006) noted that subcontractors
viewed the main contractor as their ‘customer’ and
showed little concern for other subcontractors with
whom they had to interact or indeed the ultimate pro-
ject customer. The result of this lack of integration with
other subcontractors is that defects and unfinished
work often get left behind, until they appear on snag
lists. Problems as described are often generated in
one part of the process, but not detected until some
later stage, tending to multiply the impact of the prob-
lem (Koskela et al., 2006). A supply chain collaboration
approach to the defects drives an agenda of stopping
and fixing the problems as early in the process as possi-
ble (Liker, 2004). This necessitates management of a
process that supports earlier detection of defects and
dissemination of information and an integrated
approach to problem-solving. This suggests a greater
role for collaboration and planning between partici-
pants. Improvement can be achieved, but requires bet-
ter ways of measuring and capturing data, from which
improvement metrics can be determined (Lee and
Amaral, 2002). Tools selected to address the issue
must strike a balance between the resources expended
upon inspection and prevention of the defects and the
consequential cost savings from fewer defects (Nielsen
et al., 2009). In the context of the Irish industry and
particularly the limited resources of the SME sector,
they must be seen both to improve the process, by
reducing snags while also reducing costs holistically.
The emergence of affordable information technol-
ogy (IT) at site level offers potential for significant
improvements in supply chain collaboration. The con-
struction industry still relies heavily on traditional
approaches, such as paper and pen surveys of defects
information. This approach creates bottlenecks in
information dissemination and the data are often out
of date soon after being issued (Craig and Sommerville,
2007). The latter authors describe the use of one pat-
ented snagging management system that was also
reported in field trials with major UK contractors
(Comit, 2005). The reviews are generally very favour-
able and cite analysis of cost and time savings, but pur-
chase/set-up costs of circa £4000+ and additional
annual running costs of £6000+ may potentially deter
use by SMEs.
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The cost of mobile devices has reduced signifi-
cantly, making them easily accessible to the SME mar-
ket. A low cost, effective software solution for defects
management, appropriate to the needs of the SME
market is needed to allow collaborative and real-time
management of the production process for defects.
Pilot case study overview
As part of wider PhD research, a pilot field study using
an AR strategy was undertaken. The first element was
to gather knowledge and understanding about practices
and attitudes concerning the management of defects
and rework in the subject company. AR adopts an
inductive approach based on a research cycle, which
has as its first step identification and scoping of a prob-
lem (Susman and Evered, 1978). The results presented
herein are principally related to the first or ‘diagnosing’
phase. The problem for the SME was the time and
costs involved in ongoing rectification of snagging
works in a very demanding economy. The problem
has a detrimental impact on the SME’s profitability
and cash flow.
The project was a health department building. The
contract was traditional in nature with design provided
by the client. The contractor was selected following a
two-stage process. They pre-qualified to the tender list
following submittal of extensive information regarding
the company and its relevant experience. Tenderers
subsequently bid against each other, based on the
design provided. The lowest priced tender was selected.
Project value was circa €1.4 million. Participants
reported that it was generally held as being a ‘success-
ful’ project.
Study limitations
The results presented are limited to the diagnosing
stage of the AR cycle. This involved the field researcher
attending site during the latter part of the construction
phase and covers the period just after practical comple-
tion. The reporting here does not consider defects man-
ifesting during the defects liability period. Such defects
are important and costly to the SME and will be
addressed in later reporting of the AR cycle.
Results
Anatomy of a snag
A considerable concern in the construction manage-
ment literature is the lack of systematic root cause anal-
ysis of supply chain problems (Fellows, 2010). This
lack of understanding and learning is a contributory
factor to the repetitive nature of snags, whereby the
same defects tend to be repeated in multiple projects
(Lopez et al., 2010; Rotimi et al., 2011). One of the
objectives for this AR cycle was thus to establish the
potential for collaborative effort by the supply chain
participants in the project towards investigation of root
causes of the defects found, with a view to their elimi-
nation on future projects.
The site manager’s terminal snag list was analysed.
This was the first of several terminal snag lists prepared
on the project. It is common in the industry for main
contractors to ‘pre-snag’ the works in this way, prior
to inspections by the designers. This action in itself is
somewhat of a duplication of effort, time and cost,
but is seen as a prudent measure by most contractors.
The manager’s list contained 157 separate items. A
summary analysis is provided in Table 1. In terms of
the cost of rework on the project, discussions took place
with the contractors’ quantity surveyor (CQS). He con-
firmed that they did not know the actual costs of defects
and rework on the project. The CQS said his company
did not measure such costs but typically they allowed
1–1.25% for snagging in their tenders and he found
that was usually satisfactory. It transpired in the discus-
sion that this figure was provided to cover the main
contractor’s management costs for the snagging process
(costs of quality), not for rectification of any actual
snags. The CQS stated he did not know what snagging
provision costs the subcontractors allowed in their
prices, but he agreed they would indeed provide for
them. He did however agree that a substantial ‘cost to
client/customer’ would accrue if all cost streams were
aggregated.
To better understand and make visible the costs of
snagging, the researcher and CQS priced the site man-
ager’s list using daywork rates (typically €23.00 per
hour for general trades and €30.00 per hour for special-
ists). A site inspection was used to allocate estimated
hours to the snags listed. Plant and materials estimates
and cost were similarly deduced. The agreed estimate
for the work on the site manager’s list was equal to circa
1.3% of the TPC. It is accepted that this approach is
‘ballpark’ in nature and simplistic. It was however
intended to provide illustrative rather than conclusive
evidence. Additionally the costs of the architect, electri-
cal engineers, mechanical engineer and client snag lists
must be added. Furthermore costs from additional
defects lists, prepared after the elapse of the defects
maintenance period, may be considered. In this case
the defects maintenance period is 12 months. The
CQS accepted that in aggregate, 5% or more of TPC
(circa €65 000+) could well be spent on defects and
snagging rework and snagging process management
on this otherwise ‘successful’ project.
Rework and defects 835
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Table 2 categorizes the 157 snags found on the site
manager’s list in terms of broad underlying causes. Fac-
tors included poor workmanship such as crooked radi-
ator pipes and work which was damaged after being
completed. Other factors concerned work that was only
partially completed, such as missing pipework insula-
tion and elements of work that were missing altogether,
such as mirrors in the toilet cubicles. A number of snags
were directly related to poor design and often needed
additional design input/specification to rectify them.
This included specification of additional mastic point-
ing to mask unsightly joints between different materials
in various locations. Defects however often have deeper
and multiple root causes.
To investigate and highlight the potential for root
cause analysis of defects by the supply chain partici-
pants, a selection of snags from the manager’s list were
identified and subjected to consideration in terms of
causation. Six of the listed snags concerned defects
associated with co-located electrical sockets. From a
subsequent walk around with the site manager, it was
noted that there were 15 locations on the site with
co-located electrical sockets. Thus 40% of co-located
electrical sockets on site were noted on the snag list
as requiring some form of rework. Although they are
relatively minor defects, most could not be rectified in
one visit alone and required several visits, for example,
for filling, preparation and painting.
Initial discussions with the manager and the site
trades people involved found them in agreement that
these types of snags were fairly ‘normal’; they had all
seen them many times before. There was an acceptance
that they were simply part of the job, another part of the
process. This routine acceptance of defects is noted by
Sommerville et al. (2004) and others. In an Irish con-
text the recent boom saw publication of The Irish Home-
buyers Guide to Snagging, (Boyle, 2006). A consumer
guide for the industry’s disaffected customers, so that
they could better manage the inevitable long list of
defects associated with their new homes. That such a
book exists clearly illustrates the entrenched nature of
the problem and reflects negatively on the industry.
A site assessment of the co-located socket snags was
conducted by the field researcher. This found that of
the 15 co-located sockets those that were close together
(0–50 mm) tended to have snags, while those further
apart (>50 mm) had no snags. It was also found that
all of the co-located sockets had different spacing
Table 1 Summary analysis of site manager’s snag list
Identified trade Number of snags Est. hours Cost (€) Est. plant & material cost (€)
Painter 41 60.5 1573.00 403.00
Electrician 25 60.5 1815.00 61.00
Carpenter 17 17 391.00 72.00
Furniture 6 6 180.00 0
Mechanical 31 51 1530.00 125.00
False ceiling 2 2 60.00 0
Cleaners 1 6 138.00 0
Fencing 1 32 736.00 0
Floor/wall resin co. 8 7 210.00 32.00
Not stated 4 6.5 149.50 233.00
Main contractor 2 2 46.00 0
Flooring 1 0.5 15.00 10.00
Kitchen co. 2 3.5 105.00 0
Ground-worker 10 59 1357.00 100
Tarmac 1 64 1920.00 0
Road marking 1 6 180.00 0
Landscaper 1 32 736.00 0
Roof/Guttering 1 8 240.00 0
External door co. 2 2 60.00 0
TOTAL 157 425.5 11 441.50 1036
Note: Estimated cost €12 477.50 (daywork rates applied €23.00 p/h general trades, €30.00 p/h specialist trades).
Table 2 Classification of site manager’s snag list
Item defective/workmanship 25
Item defective/damaged following completion 12
Item is not fully completed 46
Item requires additional follow-on work 1
Item is missing 54
Item is unsatisfactory/design related 17
Item is unsatisfactory/wrong specification 2
Number of snags 157
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distances and appeared to be randomly spaced. By way
of a double check a second small project, recently com-
pleted by the SME, was inspected and 11 co-located
sockets were found. Again the spacing appeared to be
totally random. These observations were discussed at
a workshop meeting with the contracts director, site
manager, and electrical and decorating subcontractors
with photographs available (provided by the field
researcher), and yielded the following insights:
 Regarding the random spacing, the group found
that the electrical design drawings used com-
puter-aided design (CAD) symbols to illustrate
the approximate location of the sockets. No
dimensional layout was usually given. The vari-
ous electricians executing the work thus ran-
domly decided themselves on what spacing to
use.
 Follow-on trades were then presented with diffi-
culty due to the (usually) small distance between
the sockets. This is not linked to the individual
materials used and was found to be common with
plaster, plasterboard, paint or tile for example.
The issue was the difficulty for operatives, in
handing and tooling small slithers of the materi-
als. Larger pieces are easier to handle cleanly
and would yield fewer or no snags.
 The organization responsible for final rectifica-
tion of the snags here, mainly the decorators, is
typically one of the finishing trades. However
the root cause of the snags occurred earlier in
the supply chain with the design and electrical
installation work. These stakeholders however
escape without consequences. The snags are thus
often passed off and classified as ‘poor workman-
ship’ but are strongly influenced by the lack of
explicit design, as root cause.
The participants’ proposed solution to this snag is
relatively simple. As the defect is related to the space
between the sockets, simply make that spacing larger
and remove the random element. The participants sug-
gested that a standard spacing of 100 mm be adopted. A
walk around site confirmed there were no dimensional
issues preventing such a spacing being adopted. Further
discussion suggested that manufacturers (of plastic or
metal electrical conduit) could simply supply pre-made
and pre-threaded spacers of 100 mm to obviate this
problem entirely. In effect, adoption of a ‘lean’
approach is suggested. This part of the process is to be
standardized and if pre-manufactured components were
used consistent spacing would be achieved (Koskela
et al., 2006). There would also be some other potential,
modest cost savings in the original work as cutting and
threading of conduit on site would be avoided by the
electrician. The solution also provides for a more consis-
tent and aesthetically pleasing end product.
Dissemination of this information to the workforce
will be achieved by simple and visual A4 instruction
sheets. Drafts of such sheets were prepared for consid-
eration and will be further developed and tested as part
of future phases of the AR cycle with the SME.
The example presented above suggests that the sup-
ply chain certainly has the technical knowledge and
experience to determine root causes of common defects
and to contribute towards viable, cost effective solu-
tions to prevent their reoccurrence. Other defects from
the list were subjected to similar scrutiny, yielding
potentially promising results.
Overview of management systems
The second area of interest in the problem scoping or
‘diagnosing’ part of the AR cycle, involved an evalua-
tion of the management systems and processes used
to manage the defects and snagging process. The field
researcher was generally given free access to all site
records and other design information and discussed
these data freely with many of the key participants, both
informally on the site and formally in interviews. Dur-
ing the course of the production phase of the project
the researcher visited the site regularly, on a weekly
basis. This helped to break down interpersonal barriers
with the workforce who became progressively more
engaged in discussing the work openly, as time went on.
During the project both the site management team
and the design team carried out ad hoc walk around
‘quality’ inspections, usually on the site meeting day
(fortnightly). These were informal in nature and did
not follow any structured format, but did identify a
number of defects that were rectified prior to handover.
The subcontractors on the site did not formally inspect
and sign off their own work, but rather left that job to
the site manager and design team to do in terminal snag
lists. The manager’s list reflected many defective snags,
but also a number of unfinished items, which were not
in themselves defective. However, these items needed
to be completed, prior to final inspection. Unfinished
work also carries a contingent risk of further defects
being created during return visits to complete such
items.
Often the subcontractors would start, but not fully
complete work because of coordination issues with
other trades or information deficits for example. They
left the site or moved on to other work on the site, while
awaiting return visits to fully complete that activity.
This common facet of construction was identified as a
type of waste called ‘making do’ (Koskela, 2004), and
its impacts are well described in Emmitt et al. (2012)
Rework and defects 837
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who suggested that this approach is a contributor to
higher levels of snags and defects.
On this project there were four snag lists prepared
towards the end of the project and one afterwards. Lists
were supplied by: (1) the site manager; (2) electrical
engineer; (3) mechanical engineer; and (4) the archi-
tect. Additionally after handover the client supplied a
small list of snags they noted during early occupancy.
The basic process of each involved a walk around
inspection, at which time snag details were recorded
with pen and paper. Upon returning to the office, the
details were transcribed to a computer. Regarding the
first list, the site manager issued copies by email to
the subcontractors for action. No copy was given to
the design team as contractually the site manager did
not view it a design team matter. The data were sup-
plied as a simple list using Microsoft Excel. The ser-
vices engineers’ lists were similarly compiled and sent
to both the main contractor and the specialist electrical
and mechanical contractors. Any items of a general nat-
ure (not for the specialists) were referred to the main
contractor, rather than any named subcontractor.
One list was supplied in Microsoft Word, the other
used PDF format. The architect’s list was similarly
compiled and sent solely to the main contractor for
action. PDF was the chosen format.
Upon receipt of the designer’s lists, the site manager
had to modify and adapt the lists and decide which sub-
contractor was responsible for each item listed, then
issue them for subcontractor action. At an appropriate
stage, the site manager decided that the snagging pro-
cess was completed and re-inspected his list and sig-
nalled the designers to re-inspect theirs.
Shammas-Toma et al. (1996) noted severe weak-
nesses in the ‘inspection list’ approach to defects detec-
tion, as described herein. They report finding many
items that had been ‘checked off’ were in fact defective
in some way (albeit, many in a minor way). Addition-
ally they found many additional defects that had not
been detected at all. Patton (2013) agrees that many
defects (including failure to meet specifications) are
simply never detected, leading to a permanent and sig-
nificant loss of customer value. He terms this phenom-
enon ‘task diminishment’.
The four snag list approaches adopted here were
compared to best practice, suggested by Sommerville
et al. (2004), to assess the completeness and robustness
of the data provided in the lists (see Table 3). These
results and additional observational assessments on site
yielded the following insights emanating from discus-
sions with project participants:
 The lists are idiosyncratic. For example, the two
engineers worked for the same design consul-
tancy, yet their lists are not consistent with each
other, let alone with lists of the other parties.
Participants felt that this approach was normal
on the projects they had worked on and mirrored
their previous experiences. This process is open
to inconsistent operation, duplication of effort
and communication failures due to lack of any
standardized (but flexible) approach.
 Several items listed are general in scope and do
not well serve the process. The architect’s list
for instance has a catch-all item of ‘Touch up
all scuffs on walls, ceiling, access panels, wood-
work etc.’ This is unquantifiable and contains
no specific locations. It is also open to narrow
or wide interpretation by recipients. The implica-
tion here is that imprecise communication/lan-
guage will lead directly to misunderstanding
and delay in execution of the works required.
 Several items listed are simply unfinished or miss-
ing, rather than necessarily being defective. They
need to be completed before they can be properly
inspected. Unfinished or missing items can be in
that state for many possible reasons. Examples
from this project included: (1) ‘making do’ as
previously described; (2) operative carelessness;
(3) delivery delay/lack of materials/late instruc-
tion; (4) poor scheduling/trades coordination;
(5) design/specification issues.
 Some snags involved collaboration by more than
one subcontractor to achieve rectification. This
was not clearly reflected in the snag lists. Thus
the responsible subcontractor may attend and
find they cannot remediate the work alone. An
example snag involved remedial work to a timber
pipe boxing. This was allocated to the carpenter,
who rectified it. However following rectification
works it then needed to be redecorated; this
aspect was not communicated (to the decorator)
on the snag list and thus the latter work was
ignored.
 The electrical snag list contains a clause indicat-
ing that no re-inspection will take place unless
the contractor confirms work is completed by sig-
nature beforehand. The engineer stated that he
had, in the past, been called back many times
to find many defects on his lists still outstanding
or only partially addressed. The participants gen-
erally agreed that this was also a common occur-
rence in their experience. Many stated that snag
list work tended to be an iterative process with
several cycles of inspection and follow-up rework
activity. This has implications in regard to ‘costs
of quality’ since repeat inspection cycles increase
costs. Repeat contractor visits to attend to rework
are also disproportionately expensive as previ-
ously discussed.
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 The four lists were disseminated using three dif-
ferent software programs and using inconsistent
styles. This meant the contractor had to manipu-
late the lists into new documents that could be
sent to subcontractors. Similar issues also prevent
viable post-contract analysis and reporting from
the lists. None of the participants proffered any
particular reasons why this was the case; they all
stated they would have no objection if a consis-
tent approach was agreed and adopted from the
outset. The issue appears to stem simply from a
lack of coordination. Such coordination would
of course improve communication and the data-
handling processes.
 The lack of simple data elements such as individ-
ual snag numbers and snag completion dates
makes it difficult to track completed work and
also makes post-contract analysis difficult with-
out data re-entry. Again the participants offered
no real explanation of why this was the case,
other than the disengaged and idiosyncratic nat-
ure of the management process being used. Par-
ticipants clearly understood the logic of allowing
better tracking of the project data and also post-
project analysis for learning purposes and gener-
ally supported adoption of a more structured
approach. They were simply never asked to do so.
 At any given stage of the process there is little
real-time information on progress. A full re-
inspection is required to ascertain any current
status position. Participants noted real frustration
in the lack of any real-time indication of ‘where
they were’ with the snagging process (both here
and in their experience). This was particularly
evident where subcontractors needed to prove
work was complete to release payments (valua-
tions/retentions).
 The client was not consulted on the snagging
process and unilaterally added their own small,
post-contract list of snags, requiring additional
return visits. Participants reported mixed
experiences. On some projects clients were heav-
ily involved in the day-to-day workings of pro-
jects, while others take a ‘hands off’ approach,
having little involvement. No particular consen-
sus was agreed by participants in terms of how
the client should be involved in the snagging
process.
The results of this overall assessment were discussed
with the participants who confirmed that this snagging
management process was ‘fairly typical’ in their expe-
rience and that the structure and content of the snag
lists were also typical. They generally agreed that a
more coordinated and collaborative supply chain effort
could have a significant impact in streamlining and
improving this area of process management. All noted
however that there was no formal forum to address
such matters in the current project process used in this
project (or on their other projects). All efforts to
Table 3 Data content of pilot study snag lists compared to best practice (adapted from Sommerville et al., 2004)
Data attribute Manager Architect Electrical engineer Mechanical engineer
Location of site ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
List revision number
Item descriptor
Snag general details ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Document reference ✓ ✓ ✓
Status of snag ✓ Partly
Updated snag status
Inspector name ✓ ✓ ✓
Date snag identified ✓ ✓
Exact snag location ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Additional details ✓ Partly ✓ ✓
General comments option ✓
Individual snag numbering
Specific checklist number
Distribution/allocation ✓ ✓ ✓
Related packages
Contractor’s confirmations
Snag completion date
Client confirmation
Verified complete by contractor ✓ ✓ ✓
Final inspector verification
Rework and defects 839
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mitigate defects and rework were unstructured and
informal.
All parties agreed that normal practice was to carry
out the snagging process individually. Nobody had any
experience of any coordinated efforts to eliminate or
better manage snagging. It was evident that no shared
or collaborative IT systems were used on this project.
The architect noted that he had some experience of
such systems from one previous project. The remainder
of the parties had no experience of working with
collaborative IT.
Suggested avenues for future research
This paper focuses primarily on the first or diagnosing
stage of the AR cycle with the SME. Some preliminary
observations on measures for the second or action plan-
ning stage are also made. Future reports will describe
the results of the concluding steps in the AR cycle,
where an agreed improvement plan is put into action
and then evaluated to study its impact on the problem.
Further iterations of the cycle may then be required, to
improve the original plan.
Conclusions
This research has considered information gained from
the first phase of anAR cycle with an SMEmain contrac-
tor. Like other construction companies it has suffered in
the Irish economic downturn and faces very significant
financial and resource pressures. The data presented
reveal problems within its productive processes for the
management of defects and snagging. These results
allow some preliminary conclusions to be drawn in terms
of improvement potential in these processes. A root
cause analysis of a common defect was presented, one
of several such defects investigated on the pilot project.
The results indicate that the supply chain participants,
when adopting more collaborative and proactive
approaches, can identify root causes and suggest possible
cost effective solutions to avoid future recurrence. Liter-
ature examined from around the world indicates that
defects aggregate to substantial wasted costs and that
even modest improvement would yield significant and
worthwhile savings throughout the supply chain. The
Irish economic situation suggests that the industry will
takemany years to recover. It is thus likely that any signif-
icant improvement in the fortunes of the SME must
come via improved productivity and efficiency. Ineffi-
ciency can no longer be masked by boom time condi-
tions. The current production process used by the
SME to manage defects and snagging does not however
provide any forum for, or seek the input of its supply
chain towards, collaboration into such matters.
The shortcomings in the management system used
to collect snagging data and the subsequent process
to rectify the defects used by the SME are clearly evi-
dent and have been fully exposed herein. Addressing
these shortcomings provides a suitable starting point
for future process improvement in terms of stage two
of the action research cycle (action planning), namely:
(1) the adoption of a collaborative supply chain
approach; (2) the adoption of a standardized manage-
ment process to manage defects and rework; (3) the
adoption of cost effective IT solutions appropriate for
SMEs; (4) the adoption of a simple/basic cost model-
ling method; and (5) a focus on learning and continu-
ous improvement. The perilous financial position of
the Irish industry is noted. Thus all initiatives to reduce
defects (and thus also costs) must be rigorously bal-
anced against any added inspection or process manage-
ment costs. Collaborative supply chain approaches
offer the potential to reduce defects, without adding
significant costs to the process, allowing a positive cost
result overall.
The results also support the conclusion that
participants in the Irish industry profess a desire for
more collaborative ways of working. They also have a
sophisticated understanding of the potential benefits
that such an approach could yield. Sadly they do not,
as yet, adopt processes and procedures to match their
ambitions for the industry.
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